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Environmental Bounty Hunters:
Reallocating Enforcement Authority
Between Citizens and the Government
Under the Clean Water Act
BY STEPHEN G. ALLEN*
The term "bounty hunter" conjures up images of the Old
West and a dark, unscrupulous rider coming into town wearing
muddy boots and a black hat and leading the horse of his
unfortunate victim who is strapped across the saddle. He will
shortly claim a reward for bringing this outlaw to justice. Few
argued that the bounty hunters did not perform a useful func-
tion; however, it was difficult to appreciate these loathsome
characters.
Today's environmental bounty hunters would be unrecogniz-
able to their traditional counterparts. They wear paisley ties and
suspenders. Their weapons are more civilized: twenty-five page
complaints and motions for partial summary judgment rather
than revolvers. They stalk the trendy restaurants of mid-town
Manhattan and frequent watering holes in posh places on Wash-
ington's M Street. Despite these differences, they continue to
bring violators to justice for a reward.
The bounty hunter may be a loathsome character but he is
a cherished image of Americana. Much of the appeal of this
* The author gratefully acknowledges the Institute for Mining and Minerals
Research and its director, Dr. Lyle Sendlein, for providing the opportunity to conduct
the research necessary for this undertaking through a Law Fellowship during 1988-89
under Title III of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The ideas
expressed in this Note however, are those of the author alone and do not represent the
views or opinions of the IMMR or Dr. Sendlein. Believing, with Justice Douglas, that
an author should "show his colors" and reveal any predilictions when he enters the
scholarly lists, so their readers know the tint of the glasses through which their advisors
view the problem, Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. Rv. 227,
229-32 (1965), the following should be noted. This author was once an professional
engineer for several mining companies in Eastern Kentucky and was responsible for
regularly preparing and submitting Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to appropriate
state and federal regulatory agencies. The author was also involved as a marginal
participant, from an engineering perspective, in a number of citizen suits on behalf of
these mining firms.
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image is in the symbols that it invokes - unbiased law enforce-
ment for the public good.' The use of this image has, however,
camouflaged a tremendous increase in regulation under the Clean
Water Act 2 by suggesting that enforcement of regulations is
separate from Congressional policy.3 However, the level of en-
forcement of the CWA is an integral part of the overall policy
of the Act. Citizen litigation has thus evolved beyond mere
enforcement.
Environmental policy and the path of environmental regu-
lation in this country is not being set by our elected officials.
Nor is it being formulated by the Environmental Protection
Agency or any of the various state environmental authorities.
Environmental policy under the Clean Water Act is today largely
determined through enforcement by activist environmental inter-
est groups through aggressive use of citizen suit enforcement
procedures. Congress has given the citizen the power to enforce
many environmental laws through statutes authorizing private
law enforcement4 - a concept that has come to be known as
the private attorney general.5
Under the current version of the CWA, the citizen suit is
"the means of seeking a major - perhaps permanent - rea-
lignment of roles and powers in important areas of regula-
tion .... ",6
The legislative purpose7 of creating an effective remedy for
the enforcement of the CWA is obstructed by uncertainty and
inconsistency in citizen suit actions adjudicated without reference
I Garth, Nagel and Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives From a Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
353, 353-54, 395 (1988). The authors note that while the private attorney general concept
(see infra notes 119-143 and accompanying text) stands out as a successful, progressive
legal reform, it has been accompanied by a renewed crises in recent years. Id.
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments [Clean Water Act, CWA or
Act], 31 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
I Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 395.
4 Congress included citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1) (1982), the Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a)(1) (1982),
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1982), the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1) (1982), and
the Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1982) and others.
See infra notes 119-143 and accompanying text.
6 Boyer and Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary As-
sessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 ButnALo L. REv. 833,
836-37 (1985).
7 See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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to national goals and policies of regulatory authorities. Although
this author is not advocating that the need for national unifor-
mity is so strong as to warrant displacement of the citizen suit,
the basic fairness and consistency of nationwide enforcement is
threatened by the current approach to section 5058 of the CWA
by citizen groups. Agency rulemaking to set minimum standards
for citizen suit remedies is suggested as a possible compromise
between aggressive private enforcement and the consistency so
necessary to fulfill the goals of a nationwide policy of cleaner
water.
Ultimately, Congress and the courts have responded to the
perceived abuses and virtues of citizen enforcement. This Note
will explore the citizen involvement in enforcement and the
evolution of this shifting balance of power in light of the growth
of the doctrine of the private attorney general, the 1987 Amend-
ments to the CWA, and the landmark citizen suit case of Gwalt-
ney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.9
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT - STATUTORY HISTORY AND
FRAMEWORK
To appreciate how far citizen enforcement has come and the
impact of the private attorney general concept, one must have
a basic understanding of the Clean Water Act.' 0
A. Refuse Act
The federal role in water pollution control began with the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (Refuse Act)."
Although primitively obsolete by today's regulatory standards,
the Act prohibited the discharge into navigable waters of the
United States of "any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing there from in a liquid state .... ,,12 This early enforce-
' Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; see
infra, notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
9 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
10 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 and Supp. IV, 1986).
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (Refuse Act), 30 Stat. 1151
(1899), 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 411 (1982). See generally Rodgers, Industrial Water
Pollution and The Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L.
REv. 761 (1971) (discussing the various requirements of the Clean Water Act).
,2 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
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ment tool was held to impose a form of "strict liability" on
violators which means no showing of intent or negligence was
required for imposition of sanctions."
The Refuse Act authorized "bounties" to informers who
alerted the government to violators of the Act's restrictions on
dumping refuse into navigable waters.' 4 These actions were on
the common law qui tam actions. A qui tam action is defined
as a "civil proceeding in which an informer sues for the govern-
ment, as well as for himself, to recover a penalty under a
particular statute."' 5 The informer was allowed to keep a portion
of the amount recovered by the government.
In the early 1970s, citizens attempted to use the Refuse Act
to sue for civil and criminal penalties.1 6 By this time, however,
bounty hunting generally had fallen into disfavor. Courts ruled
that only criminal actions were permitted under the statute and
these must only be brought by United States Attorneys. 7 Ar-
guably, all industrial discharges were criminal violations under
the Act before 1970 because no regulatory system permitting any
level of pollution had been established.
8
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Acts
Without repealing the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Congress
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in
1948.19 The FWPCA was amended five times prior to 1972,20
'1 See United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-24 (1st Cir. 1974);
Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the Enforcement of the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1978-79).
. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466n (1982).
'1 Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581, 591 n.17 (9th Cit. 1979); Sierra Club v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally Note, The
History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81 (discussing the history
of qui tam actions in both England and the United States).
J1 . MacDonald & J. Conway, Environmental Litigation, § 7.06, at 121 (1972).
See also Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 HASTINGs L.J.
782 (1971).
17 United States v. Florida-Vanderbilt Dev. Corp., 326 F.Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F.Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971); J.
MacDonald & J. Conway, supra note 16, § 7.06, at 121.
11 Olds, Unkovic and Lewin, supra note 13, at 3.
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1948 [FWPCAJ, Pub. L. No. 80-845, ch.
750, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 and
Supp. IV, 1986)).
o Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, ch.
518, 70 Stat. 498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L.
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but federal involvement under the Act was generally limited to
financial support for state programs and, later, a few largely
ineffective enforcment efforts.2' Although the procedure for fed-
eral abatement and enforcement had been available under the
FWPCA since 1948, only one judicial proceeding had been com-
pleted in 1972.22 Unlike the Refuse Act, Congress did not provide
for citizen enforcement under the FWPCA. Rather, the primary
responsibility of enforcing the Act was given to the states.
23
Riding a tide of strong environmental populism, Congress
passed in 1972 what is now commonly known as the Clean
Water Act which are really amendments to the FWPCA.2 These
amendments "took a vigorous new approach" to water pollution
control. 25 Among the objectives of the new law was the resto-
ration and maintenance of "the chemical, physical, and biolog-
ical integrity of the Nation's waters.'"'2 The Clean Water Act,
as amended, is a comprehensive regulatory program.
27
C. NPDES System
The heart of the Clean Water Act is its permit program
regulating discharges of pollutants from point sources. 28 Con-
gress wanted a simplified, straight-forward program for pollu-
No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903;
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
2, Robbins and Montgomery, What Water Quality Lawyers Should Know About
Water Law, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 16 (Winter 1986).
2 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3668, 3672. See generally Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement
Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in
Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970); Olds, Unkovic and
Lewin, supra note 13, at 2-6.
21 Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, supra note 13, at 2.
11 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 [FWPCAA], (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982
and Supp. IV, 1986)).
25 Robbins and Montgomery, supra note 21, at 16.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
27 W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIO NMENTAL LAW § 4.2 (1977). There are five
titles in the Act, articulating eight important policies including citizen participation and
discouragement of red tape. Id. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(e), (f) (1982).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). A point source is "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C §
1362(14)(1982). Cf. Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 27 ENv'r. REP. (BNA) 1591,
1596 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (defendant Westinghouse charged with violating § 1311 of the
Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants from a point source without a permit).
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tion control, one that would involve little dispute as to whether
a violation had been committed. To achieve the Act's goals,
EPA was empowered to set national effluent limits that fixed
the maximum lawful discharge of certain pollutants. 29 These
limits are incorporated into the terms and conditions of a Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
required by the Act.30 Ultimately, the system would become an
absolutely critical weapon to the environmental plaintiff.
The permittee is required to monitor its effluent at regular
intervals. 31 Permittees are required to submit the results of
their effluent tests to the EPA or other issuing agency at
periodic intervals.3 2 This information is to be submitted on
forms known as Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs).33
DMRs thus indicate whether the permittee violated its permit
limits during the reporting period.3 4 These reports are available
- 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (1982). An effluent limitation is defined to include "any
restriction established by a State or the Administrator [of EPA] on quantities, rates,
and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone,
or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)(1982). These
limitations are most often expressed numerically, as for example the concentration of a
discharged pollutant in milligrams per liter. For an explanation of effluent limitations,
see I F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03 [4], 3-140 (1986).
40 C.F.R. § 122 (1987).
33 U.S.C. § 1342; 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (1987). The NPDES is the current
codification of the old permit program begun by the Corps of Engineers under the
Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (current version at
33 U.S.C. §§ 407 and 411 (1982)). See Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 556 (1971),
reprinted in 33 U.S.C. § 407 app. at 638-39 (1982).
32 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1982).
13 Niehaus, Clean Water Act Permitting; The NPDES Program at Fifteen, NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T. 16, 19 (Winter 1987) ("[tlhe permit ... will include standard
reporting requirements which compel the permittee to submit monthly discharge moni-
toring reports (DMR)").
-, Many NPDES permit conditions are standardized boilerplate:
[Plermit terms established by EPA require the permittee to mitigate viol-
ations which would adversely affect human health or the environment; to
properly operate and maintain the treatment system; to allow EPA or its
authorized representative to enter and inspect the facilities; to conduct
monitoring representative of the regulated activity and keep complete re-
cords of the monitoring activities for three years; and to comply with the
permit.
Id. permit holders are also required to report orally within 24 hours certain specified
acts of non-compliance; (1) any exceedance which may endanger health or the environ-
ment; (2) any unanticipated bypass exceeding an effluent limitation; (3) any upset or
incident in which there is unintentional and temporary noncompliance due to factors
beyond the permittee's reasonable control, which exceeds an effluent limitation; and (4)
[VOL. 5:257
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to the public.35
A permit holder who exceeds an effluent limitation will be
strictly liable3 6 for such a violation, not unlike liability under the
old Refuse Act." Challenges to the accuracy of the submitted
data in the DMRs by the permittee have typically been unsuc-
cessful.38 Good-faith errors in monitoring discharges and pre-
paring DMRs are not totally foreclosed however.3 9
A discharger who violates an established standard limitation
or order in its NPDES permit is subject to enforcement under
the CWA by the following:
(1) the EPA, under section 30940 or section 50441;
(2) a state, where there exists with an approved pollutant
discharge elimination system permit (SPDES), pursuant to sec-
any exceedance of a maximum daily discharge limitation. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(6)
(1987). See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (m)(l) (1987) (defining "bypass"); 40 C.F.R. §
122.41(n)(1) (1987) (defining "upset").
1, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(1982).
36 Although "strictly liable" suggests tort liability, the CWA is similarly unforgiv-
ing by allowing the Administrator to begin enforcement action against "any person ...
in violation of any condition or limitation" of a valid NPDES permit without regard to
negligence, proximate cause or intent. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1)(1982); Blomquist, Rethink-
ing the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean
Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L.
REv. 337, 390 (1988).
,1 Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1409 (D.
Conn. 1987). "Under the FWPCA, compliance is a matter of strict liability and a
defendant's intention to comply or good faith attempt to do so does not excuse a
violation .. " Id. But cf. Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169, 1174 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 501 (1987) (holding that "occasional, minor discharges
by the facilities in the face of permit compliance rates exceeding 95%" are "de minimis"
and not the appropriate subject of a violation).
11 Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d 1480, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987); Connecticut
Fund for the Env't. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1416-17 (D. Conn. 1987) ("If
an entity reports a pollution level in excess of the Permit limits, it is strictly liable, as
congress has manifested an intention that the courts not reconsider the effluent discharge
levels reported.").
11 Price, Private Enforcement of the Clean Water Act , 1 NAT. Ras. & ENV. 31,
60 (Winter 1986) (the author, the EPA's Assistant Administrator of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring, suggests such errors "should be considered by a court when
granting relief or imposing a penalty"); see also, Connecticut Fund for the Env't. v.
Upjohn, 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1417, n.33 (leaving open the situation in which the DMRs'
accuracy is alleged to result from clerical or typographical errors).
-o 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982) (authorizing administrative orders, civil actions, criminal
prosecutions, injunctive relief and civil penalties in civil action).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (granting the EPA Administrator or state equivalent the
authority to seek emergency relief in cases of imminent and substantial endangerment).
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tion 40242 and under relevant state laws; or
(3) any citizen, under section 505.
4
1
D. Relief Available Under the Clean Water Act
In the context of multiple enforcement opportunities," it is
important to understand what relief is available to the citizen
against one who violates an effluent limitation.
Enforcement of the CWA is through a comprehensive regu-
latory program. 45 The primary vehicle to secure compliance under
the act is the administrative order, or more often referred to as
a "compliance order." The enforcement authority has the option
of bringing a civil action against the discharger if he does not
comply with the compliance order or the enforcement authority
may bring the civil action in lieu of the compliance order.
47
Criminal penalties are also available against any person "who
negligently violates" the Act's requirements or permit conditions
or limitations48 or who knowingly makes false statements, repre-
sentations or certifications in any application. False or mislead-
ing Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMR) or other document
submitted to the regulatory authority may also result in criminal
sanctions. 49 These are available only to government enforcement
authorities.
Any person who violates the terms or conditions of his
NPDES permit is subject to civil penalties.5 0 Section 309(d) was
42 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982) (allowing each state to administer its own permit
program upon approval by EPA). See Environmental Protection Agency v. California
ex rel State Water Resources Control Bd. 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (violation of a
discharge permit, whether issued by EPA or a state, is a violation of the Act and exposes
the permit holder to liability under § 505 of the Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1982).
43 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). See infra note 63-108 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 40.
"' Rodgers, supra note 27, at § 4.21 (the CWA was strongly influenced by the
earlier Clean Air Act). "As with the Clean Air Act, the emphasis is upon administrative
remedies" and "suffers from many of its weaknesses." Id.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1982).
,7 Id. at § 1319(a)(3), (b).
41 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982). Criminal violations under the Act are punishable
by fines of as much as "$50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more
than two yearb, or by both." Id.
,9 Id. at § 1319(c)(2).
50 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313, 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News (101 Stat.) 7, 46-47 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982)).




amended in 1987 to increase the amount of the per-day civil
penalty5 and allow multiple penalties per day for different per-
mit limits such as different chemical parameters, monthly limits
and daily limits.52 The amended section also specifies factors
affecting the amount of the penalty such as seriousness of the
violation, economic benefit received from not complying, history
of previous violations, good faith efforts to comply and eco-
nomic impact of the penalty on the discharger.5" In what appears
to be an effort to ameliorate the harshness of citizen suits for
multiple violations, the amendments give the court the ability to
reduce the amount of the penalty to a single violation in the
event of a "single operational upset."
5 4
The EPA issued a penalty policy for its agency enforcement
personnel in February 1984.15 Many of the factors included in
the policy were obviously incorporated into the 1987 Amend-
ments.5 6 The policy points out that the "first goal" of civil
penalties is to deter people from violating the law.57 The conflict
between a legitimate deterrence policy intended by Congress and
the resulting perception of unnecessarily punishing a violator
have spawned many of the debates, commentary and litigation





, See EPA Civil Penalty Policy, [Federal Laws] 41 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 2991 (June
1, 1984); L. JORGENSON & J. KnaAEL, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the
Corporation 12-13 (1988).
56 The penalty policy included such factors as: (1) "[tjhe amounts and types of
costs a defendant has delayed paying," (2) "[tjhe amounts and types of costs that a
defendant was able to completely avoid by failing to comply," (3) "gains made by the
violator in terms of the competitive advantage obtained through non-compliance," (4)
"the size of the violator" and (5) his "ability ... to pay a civil penalty." L. JORGENSON
& J. KnmAEL, supra note 55, at 12-13.
11 EPA Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 55, at 2991-92.
Specifically, the penalty should persuade the violator to take precautions against falling
into noncompliance again (specific deterrence) and dissuade others from violating the
law (general deterrence). Successful deterrence is important because it provides the best
protection for the environment. In addition, it reduces the resources necessary to ad-
minister the laws by addressing noncompliance before it occurs.
Id. Accord United States v. T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc. 681 F. Supp. 314
(D.S.C. 1988). The court here held the "[assessment of the amount of a civil penalty
is committed to the informed discretion of the Court" (citing United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 230 (1975) and United States v. Phelps Dodge
Industries, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1340, 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). The Court went on to say
it "should give effect to the major purpose of a civil penalty: deterrence." Id. at 322.
Accord United States v. Swingline, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 37, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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E. Citizen Suit Provision
The first citizen suit legislation was drafted by Professor
Joseph L. Sax of the University of Michigan Law School for
the West Michigan Environmental Action Council.5" Impressed
by Professor Sax's ideas for wide ranging citizen involvement in
his book Defending the Environment,59 the Council asked Sax
to write a legislative reform measure for consideration by the
Michigan legislature. 6° Professor Sax then authored the Model
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (MNRA)
upon which a number of state statutes have been modeled. 6' The
Act significantly changed the status of citizen plaintiffs in envi-
ronmental suits to overcome some traditional obstacles to private
environmental actions: standing, primary jurisdiction and ex-
haustion of administrative remedies. 62 It is unclear what effect
this legislation had on the development of the citizen suit pro-
visions that were being considered at that time for inclusion in
the Clean Air Act, although it can be assumed that they were
at least brought to the attention of federal legislatures.
The Clean Water Act explicitly authorizes citizens to bring
suit to enforce any "effluent standard or limitation" against
"any person ... alleged to be in violation" or against the
regulatory authority to require it to perform a mandatory duty
under the Act. 63 The citizen suit provision was included in the
DiMento, Asking God to Solve Our Problems: Citizen Environmental Suit
Legislation in the Western States, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 169, 171 (1982).
9 J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
66 DiMento, supra note 58, at 171.
62 Id. Versions of the MNRA or Sax Act had been passed in at least 10 states in
1982: California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey and South Dakota. Id. at Table A, 174-75.
12 Id. at 172. The Michigan act became law on October 1, 1970. Id. SEE MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1973).
63 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). Citizen Suits.
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf -
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Adminstrator where there is alleged a failure of the
[VOL. 5:257
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Act for two principal reasons: (1) to encourage agency enforce-
ment and (2) to help abate future violations CWA regulations
and permit limits. 64
The first federal citizen suit provision was passed in the early
1970s when the Democratic Party held a majority in both houses
of Congress and they were very distrustful of the enforcement
intentions of the Republican administration. 65 This political cli-
mate "fostered strong Congressional interest in encouraging cit-
izen participation in enforcement of federal environmental
laws." 66 A truly novel section was added to the Clean Air Act,
passed in 1970, that viewed the citizen as watchdog on the EPA
- the citizen suit provision. 67 It seems as if the overriding intent
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. The district courts shall have juris-
diction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of
the parties, to enforce such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate
civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(l) of this section -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in
any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene
as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except that
such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case
of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and
1317(a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such
manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
(C) Venue; Intervention by Administrator; United States interests
protected (1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source of an
effluent standard or limitation or an order respecting such standard or
limitation may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in
which such source is located. (2) In such action under this section, the
Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
", Note, Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act, 85 MIcH.
L. Rav. 1656, 1675-76 (June 1987); Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of Engineers, 12 Envt.
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1740 (D. Alaska 1978); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1093 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987).
6, Blomquist, supra note 36, at 366.
"Id.
67 Id. at 367; 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982).
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of the section was to alert the government to a potential violation
of the CWA and urge it to take action.68 Congress even admitted
its intent to "correct the Administration's lack of aggressiveness
in implementing congressional requirements." 69
Congress adopted this policy at a time when the citizen as
prosecutor, also known as the private attorney general was de-
scribed a neutral social advocate, who would help establish even
handed enforcement of the, laws. 70 While the citizen suit provi-
sion has remained virtually unchanged, the naive and idealistic
view of the citizen's motivations has collapsed.
71
Section 505 of the CWA, unlike the Clean Air Act on which
it was modeled, 72 allows citizens to sue both for injunctive relief
and civil penalties. 73 Although a successful citizen suit may ex-
tract civil penalties from a violator, these monies go to the
United States Treasury74 and not to the citizen plaintiff. 75 Al-
Note, supra note 64, at 1667, n.59 ("[t]he constant emphasis [in the CWA's
legislative history] . . . suggests that Congress thought governmental enforcement pref-
erable"). The author goes on to quote the Conference Report on the FWPCAA of 1972:
"If the Administrator or a State begins a civil or criminal action on its own against an
alleged polluter, no court action [can] take place on the citizen's suit." Id. (citing S.
CoNF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1972)).
69 Id. (citing H. R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 5356, 5360).
10 See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
7, See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
[hereafter CAA], 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
13 Note, supra note 64, at 1656-57; W. ROGERS, supra note 27, at § 1.13; 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
14 Babich and Hanson, Opportunities for Environmental Enforcement and Cost
Recovery by Local Governements and Citizen Organizations, 18 ENvTL. L. RaP. (Envt.
L. Inst.) 10165, 10171 (May 1988); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foun-
dation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 379 (1987).
" The Supreme Court has clearly held that there is no private right of action for
damages under the Clean Water Act. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1981); see also Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F.
Supp. 862, 863 n.l (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (no private right of action for damages; all fines
accrue to the federal government), aff'd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984); City of Philadelphia
v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1145-46 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same); Lykins v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 27 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1590, 1596 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("[Clearly,
plaintiffs are prohibited from recovering general damages under FWPCA"); see generally
Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 121 (1985) (discussing private rights of action under different environmental
statutes). Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to imply a right of action
under § 309(d) for a state government. California v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 845 F.2d 222,
224-25 (1988) (State of California had attempted to subject a federal facility with a
state-issued permit to civil penalty).
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though private damages were not available, the goal was for
"citizens to enforce the rights of the generally affected com-
munity rather than their own economic interests.' '76 The drafters
of citizen suit legislation suspected it would "be the rare, rather
than the ordinary, person . . [who] will initiate court ac-
tion. .. . 77
Citizens were to bring suits under section 505 as private
attorneys general78 rather than in a qui tam action. 79 The former
concept has flourished in environmental statutes largely as a
result of congressional displeasure with the level of enforcement
achieved by EPA.80 However, "citizen enforcement through the
courts should be secondary to administrative enforcement by
EPA."8' To this end, section 505 requires that a citizen plaintiff
notify both the EPA and other regulatory authority (if there is
an approved state program) and the alleged polluter at least sixty
days before the suit is commenced.8 2 The commentators and the
legislative history of the Act indicate the government was to use
this time period to respond to the situation brought to its atten-
tion.83 Although there has previously been a tremendous amount
6 Galloway, The Citizens' Suit: Its Purposes and Its Use, 6 EASTERN MiN. L.
INST. § 7A.01 (1985) (citing e.g. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1977).
- Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing 116 CONG. REc. 33104 (1970), remarks by Senator Hart about the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Air Act).
," Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987);
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 449 (D. Md.
1985).
79 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
w See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S.
Ct. 3088, 3095-96 (1986); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (noting congressional intent to provide for enforce-
ment by "private attorneys general").
11 L. JORGENSON AND J. KBMMEL, supra note 55, at 7 (citing Hallstrom v. Tilla-
mook, 26 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1809, 1810 (9th Cir. 1987); see Gwaltney of Smithfield
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 108 S. Ct. 376, 382-83 (1987) (citizen suits supple-
ment the enforcement power of the EPA); accord Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A. at
1522.
82 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
83 Note, Statute of Limitations for Citizens Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 195, 201 at n.42 (1986). The author observes that Senator Muskie
explained the purpose of the notice provision was "that [the citizen] might trigger
administrative action to get the relief that he might otherwise seek in the courts." Id.
(citing 116 CONG. REc. 32,927 (1970)); see also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519
F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Congress intended ... citizens suits . . . [as a way]
most likely to trigger governmental action..."). As a practical matter, the time required
for EPA and the United States Justice Department bureaucracies to evaluate, prepare
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of litigation over the effect of government enforcement actions,84
the 1987 amendments and the recent Gwaltney decision promise
to virtually eliminate this issue.85
Although lawmakers generally perceive the citizen suit pro-
vision to be accomplishing its original goals, 86 the Ninety-ninth
Congress has recently taken measures to limit the citizen suit
impact under section 505, "responding to the perception that
citizens might be abusing their authority to obtain penalties.
'87
The EPA enforcement authority, however, was increased under
the 1987 Amendments to the CWA.8 8 Significantly, Congress
required more government oversight over settlement agreements.
Consent decrees between citizens and polluters now must be
submitted to the Justice Department and EPA at least forty-five
days before court approval.8 9
and file an enforcement case after citizen suit notice is received is said generally to be
much longer than 60 days. Babich and Hanson, supra, note 74, at 10171 n.74 (citing
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part I1, 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10064 (1984)).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Violation of the 60-day notice provision has spawned
extensive litigation, with varying results; see generally Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572
F. Supp. 828 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd., 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller, Private
Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10063-67 (Feb. 1984); Schwartz & Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry
Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. REsouRcEs LAW 327, 345-48 (1984); Note, supra
note 64, at n.104; Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Litigation, 79
MICH. L. REv. 299 (1980).
85 The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act changed the preemptive nature
of government enforcement to allow certain types of administrative enforcement actions
to preclude a citizen suit. Water Quality Act of 1987, § 314(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(g)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1987). In fact, the new amendments allow EPA to assess administra-
tive penalties without judicial process. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at n.2. Prior to the 1987
amendments, the EPA had preemptively sued in the face of less than one percent of all
CWA notices it received. Price, supra note 39, at 60.
8 L. JORGENSON AND J. KIMMEL, supra note 55, at 1 (Congress recently stated that
citizen suits "have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gains") (citing
S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1985)). The Administrator of EPA expressed
similar feelings in a 1984 memorandum to regional EPA officials: "EPA values the
efforts of citizen groups to bring instances of noncompliance to our attention and to
support EPA's efforts to reduce that noncompliance." Id. at 12.
87 Id. at 3, supra note 55, at 3.
88 Id. Through the reauthorization of the CWA, Congress increased the govern-
ment's monitoring of litigation initiated under the citizen suit provision. Id. Congress
also expanded the power of the EPA Administrator to assess penalties for each violation
and for each day it exists. Id. Expanded penalty enforcement was intended to streamline
the agency's enforcement procedures against violations that are "clearly documented
and easily corrected and will likely be uncontested by the violator." S. REP. No. 50,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1985).
89 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 46 (1987), U.S. CODE
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Prior to the 1987 Amendments, the only governmental action
which could bar a citizen suit was that set out in section 505(b),
which provided that no suit be commenced under section 505(a)
if the Administrator or a state had "commenced" and was
"diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court ...
to require compliance."9° However, the recently amended section
505 allows certain administrative actions to preclude citizen suits.91
The legislative history of both the notice provision and the
government enforcement preclusion provision strongly suggests
that Congress included them principally to spur governmental
enforcement action92 and to ensure that citizens and agencies
would not pursue identical enforcement actions simultaneously. 9
CoN . & Aor.mi. NEws (101 Stat.) 7, 47-48 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3))
(Supp. V 1987).
- 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) (1982). Probably the most litigated issue in the
development of citizen's suits had been what effect government actions have under this
section including such disputes as the definitions of "diligently prosecuting," "civil
action," and "in court." The results of this extensive litigation have been mixed. Many
courts read the language of the statute very narrowly and thus precluded few citizens
suits. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1987)
(analyzing the conflicting circuits' opinions of whether administrative action is a bar to
citizen's suits); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1985); Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott Inc., 579
F. Supp. 1528, 1533-35 (D.N.J. 1984) (if agency action is the functional equivalent of
"action in court", the citizen suit is barred); Note, supra note 64 at 1676-77 nn.104-
110.
", The 1987 Amendments changed the language of § 505(a) to read: "Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 1319(g)(6) .... Water Quality
Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V 1987). § 1319 (g)(6), as amended, provides
that any violation -
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently prose-
cuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsection ... shall
not be the subject of a civil penalty action under subsection (d) of this
section or section 1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of this title.
"Any action under .. . this subsection" would refer to subsection 1319(g) which au-
thorizes the imposition of administrative penalties under certain circumstances and
conditions.
11 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, 80 (1971), reprinted in 2 A
LEGIsLATWE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
1497-98 (1973) (indicating that notice provisions were to "further encourage and provide
for agency enforcement .... The time between notice and filing of the action should
give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged viola-
tion."); Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters; Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARv. ENVTL.
L. Rav. 23, 24 (1985) (citizens suits "may serve to prod public authorities into enforcing
environmental laws with increased zeal"). The author incicates that this justification
arose repeatedly in the congressional debates over the citizen suit provision of the CWA.
Id.
93 S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1972), reprinted in I A
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Clearly then, Congress has expressed a preference for agency
enforcement of the CWA.
Congress continues to adjust this balance of power between
the government and citizens to achieve deterrence, one of the
principle goals of the CWA. 94 This is so even though Congress
consistently stressed the prospective abatement of ongoing viol-
ations as the primary purpose behind citizens suits. 95 The EPA
has certainly seen the potential for pollution abatement 9 through
the threat of "quasi-punitive, economic sanctions." 97
While civil penalties have traditionally been remedial, a pol-
icy to deter and penalize violations (with penalties paid to the
United States Treasury) would seem to carry out the goals nor-
mally associated with criminal penalties. 9 An analogy to the
courts' authority to impose sanctions for civil or criminal con-
tempt points out the degree to which Congress has muddled the
two forms of relief.
The purpose behind criminal contempt sanctions is the vin-
dication or imprisonment for an actor's past conduct.9 How-
LEGisLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
328 (1973) ("If the Administrator or a State begins a civil or criminal action on its own
against an alleged polluter, no court action [can] take place on the citizen's suit."); see
generally Polebaum and Slater, Preclusion of Citizen Environmental Enforcement Liti-
gation by Agency Action, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10013 (Jan. 1986).
" See supra note 57; Note, supra note 64, at 1671; see generally Olds, Unkovic
and Lewin, supra note 13 (arguing that the real goal of civil penalties under the CWA
is deterrence and penalization).
91 Note, supra note 64 at 1671 (finding that Congress intended to make § 505 act
as a deterrent in limited situations).
96 See EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA Civil Penalty Policy
for Major Source Violators of Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, 8 ENV'T. REP.
(BNA) 2011, 2012 (Apr. 11, 1978) (suggesting that civil penalties deter violations by
dischargers by forcing them to consider potential economic losses); Roisman, The Role
of the Citizen in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10163 (July 1986) (stressing the deterrent effect of civil penalties); Price, supra note 39,
at 61 (the author, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring
for EPA in Washington, D.C., expressing her personal view that enforcement must
"deter future violations" and "sufficiently penalize past violations").
Note, supra note 64, at 1671 (questioning the policy of allowing citizen enforced
penalization of individual polluters as contradictory to the overriding Congressional
emphasis on injunctive relief against future harm).
" Olds, Unkovic and Lewin, supra note 13, at 18-19; see also Note, supra note
64 at 1678 (questioning the assumption that civil penalties sufficiently redress injuries of
plaintiffs to meet constitutional standing requirements); but cf. Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1938) (distinguishing treatment of civil penalties from criminal
penalties).
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966); United States v. United
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ever, civil contempt proceedings serve the purpose of coercing
compliance with the orders of the court and to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained by defendants' noncompli-
ance.' °° The CWA however, clearly provides for other injunctive
and prospective relief; civil penalties are for past violations. Case
law in this area supports the argument that the deterrent aspect
of the citizen suit provision would be a criminal sanction or at
least some hybrid of criminal and civil relief.' 0' A similar analysis
was used recently to find that the seventh amendment guarantees
a jury trial to determine liability for enforcement action prior
to the imposition of civil penalties under the CWA. 0 2
There is legislative history in both the Clean Air Acts to
suggest that contrary to its label, the civil penalty provision was
intended as a criminal, punitive sanction. 03 Professor Blomquist
has forcefully argued that citizens "possess vast enforcement
power and virtually unimpeded authority to impose significant
public punishment" under the CWA.1°4 No defendant has been
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947); United States v. PATCO, 678
F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1982); G. & C. Merriam Col v. Webster Dictionary Co., 639 F.2d
29, 40 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Martorano, 346 A.2d 22, 27-28 (Pa. 1975).
-o Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369-70; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
at 303-04; United States v. PATCO, 678 F.2d at 3-4; G.& C. Merriam Co., 639 F.2d
at 40-41; In re Martorano, 346 A.2d at 27-29.
,o Sanctions for civil contempt must be "wholly remedial." Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1941) (quoting McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939).
Criminal proceedings remain available to punish . .. for past violations) (emphasis
added). United States v. PATCO, 678 F.2d at 4. A definite fine which is neither
compensatory, nor conditioned on future violations . .. is punitive and can by imposed
only in criminal contempt proceedings. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 517 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1975).
,02 Tull v. United States, ,07 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). For a discussion on the character
of the injunctive relief and civil penalty provisions of the CWA, see Note, United States
v. Tul: Jury Trials in Statutory Proceedings, 4 J. MiN. L. & PoL'y 359 (1988-89)
(authored by J. Kolanz).
03 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONo. & ADmNq. NEws 1077, 1149 (the drafters relied on the rationale of several Supreme
Court authorities upholding strict criminal liability when labeling the "civil" penalty
provision). For an excellent discussion of the criminal nature of the nominally "civil"
penalty provision, see Olds, Unkovic and Lewin, supra note 13, at 19; Blomquist, supra
note 36, at 384 ("Despite their label, 'civil penalties' are the functional monetary
equivalent of criminal penalties because of the enormous aggregate potential of
fines .. ").
- Blomquist, supra note 36, at 382 (in his recent attack on the "citizen as
prosecutor" model of § 505 enforcement, professor Blomquist advocates Congressional
limitations on the private enforcement of the Act's public penal policies).
JOURNAL OF MINmRtAL LAW & POLICY
successful, however, in challenging a civil penalty based on this
conflict in purposes. 05
In line with this distinction, a discharger recently made a
"well framed constitutional challenge" to citizen suit enforce-
ment based upon a violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine.' °6 The defendants argued that the constitutional scheme
was abridged when private citizens were granted powers vested
exclusively in the executive branch. 107 The "criminal" nature of
the deterrence policy of civil penalties in citizen suits would seem
to buttress this argument considerably by claiming usurpation
or at least impairment of the state's prosecutorial function. 08
II. CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT
A. Early Citizen Enforcement Efforts
Private enforcement of water pollution laws in Anglo-Amer-
ican law has been traced back to 1388.109 Richard II and the
English Parliament were forced to pass a water pollution control
statute to relieve the public health problem caused by the un-
controlled dumping of "filth and garbage" into the Thames
River and other streams near London." 0
t0, A thorough analysis of the criminal nature of these penalties and their impact
is beyond the scope of this Note.
- Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620
(D. Md. 1987); Natural Resources Law - 1987: The Year In Review, Section of Natural
Resources Law, ABA, and The National Energy Law & Policy Institute, at 233 (March
15, 1988).
107 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 652 F. Supp. at 623-26.
- It would appear that if an appeal on these grounds were to reach the United
States Supreme Court, at least one Justice would be sympathetic to the separation of
powers argument. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2630 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the power and decision to prosecute is inherently in the
Executive Branch and any legislation granting others this power would be unconstitu-
tional); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 680-83 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(decrying the Court's recent decisions on the separation of powers). The court in
Chesapeake Bay Foundation rejected this argument holding that the doctrine is concerned
only with preventing one branch of government from exercising powers at the expense
of another and citizens suits do not unduly tread in this area. 652 F. Supp. at 624.
,o9 Blomquist, supra note 36, at 363 (citing Stat. 12 Rich. II, ch. 13 (1388)).
o Id.; Boyer and Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BussAio L. REv.
833, 946-47 (1985) (discussing the early English experience with the concept of shared
private and public law enforcement responsibility).
[VOL. 5:257
ENVIRONMENTAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
Later private enforcement actions in England were based on
the qui tam doctrine."' These actions were eventually abolished
as they were abused by many who used them. 1 2 Ultimately, the
citizen enforcers were seen not as "legitimate spokespersons for
the public interest but rather as 'unprincipled pettifoggers' whose
office [was] a nuisance and 'an instrument of individual extor-
tion, caprice and tyranny.' ""3
Parallel problems with qui tam proceedings, including "vex-
atious and collusive" enforcement, developed in the United
States." 4 Congress continued to enact qui tam type legislation
however."' As late as 1943, the United States Supreme Court
continued to cite such actions with approval."
6
A recent attack on the "citizen as prosecutor" model of
citizen enforcement argues that the model undermines several
"important outcome-independent values of the American legal
system" including "process values, rule of law values and divi-
sion of legal labor values.""17 As citizen enforcement efforts
escalate, the regulated community has expressed more and more
skepticism about the "motivation and legitimacy" of those who
bring citizen suits under section 505.11 s These developments are
Blomquist, supra note 36, at 364.
11 Id. Three factors led to their abuse and eventual abolition: the violations they
were used against were "largely victimless crimes", the statutes themselves were char-
acterized by "overt class bias and paternalism", and the use of "excessive enforcement"
led to a "growing disrespect for the laws themselves and widespread contempt for those
who enforced them." Boyer and Meidinger, supra note 110, at 954.
" Boyer and Meidinger, supra note 110, at 954 (quoting 2 L. RADziNowicz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRnaNAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 139 (1982)).
"' Blomquist, supra note 36, at 365 (some American jurisdicitons passed laws
restricting these actions).
"' See e.g., The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982). This Act was passed
during the Civil War to curb widespread fraud in government contracting. Terris,
PRIVATE WATCHDOGS: INTERNAL AuDmING AND EXTERNAL ENFORCEMENT - THREE PER-
sPEcTIvEs, [A. Environmentalists' Citizen Suits] 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10254, 10255 (July 1987). This Act encouraged private citizens to sue government
contractors for fraud and allowed the successful plaintiff to keep one-fourth of any
amount recovered. Id.
"6 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (Black, J.) ("Qui
tam suits have been frequently permitted by legislative action, and have not been without
defense by the courts.").
"I Blomquist, supra note 36 at 340. Rule of law values are described as "certainty,
predictability, reliability, and even-handness." Id. at 343. Examples of legal labor values
are "democratic control, efficiency of specialization, and distinctive competency." Id.
The author goes on to describe process values as "fair participation in a legal process."
Id.
I'8 Boyer and Meidinger, supra note 110, at 959.
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not surprising given the checkered history of citizen enforcement.
B. The Citizen as Private Attorney General
The term "private attorney general" was first coined in
Associated Industries v. Ickes."19 This was a consumer action to
keep down the price of coal in New York City during World
War 11.120 The court used the term in describing a private citizen
who sued "on behalf of consumers" to "vindicate the public
interest.'' A Yale Law Journal Comment expanded this theme
in 1949,122 and the Supreme Court embraced this model in 1963.23
The concept of the private attorney general can be found in
three variations of the "liberal legal tradition":
(1) "social advocacy" approach: this theory translates the
political claims of particular groups into enforceable rights in
order to persuade courts to promote a political end;
(2) "neutral solution" approach: advocacy under this theory
is seen as a 'solution to the problem of unequal political
advocacy by competing interest groups; and
(3) "inadequate law enforcement" model: this model proposes
the correct mix of incentives be developed to encourage indi-
viduals to act to enforce specific legislation.
24
Early use of the private attorney general concept was cen-
tered on the "social advocacy" approach.' 25 This theory was
replaced however, by a "neutral solution" approach - advocacy
that would balance the scales of justice. 126 The policy underlying
this movement assumed that groups that had previously been
accorded favor due to their "progressive ideas" (the ACLU,
NAACP and Sierra Club for example) could present their views
- Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 357 (citing Associated Industries v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)).
120 Id.
12 Id. at 357-58.
I2 d. at 358; see Comment, Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight
for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574 (1949).
2 Id.; see e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
' Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 357.
,25 Id. at 357-59; See e.g., Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1943).
- Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 359-60. This shift in the image of the




to balance the debate. 27 This image was promoted by Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion in Flast v. Cohen.
28
During this same period running from the early 1960s to the
mid-1970s, the Supreme Court strongly supported the creation
of private rights of action under federal statutes to effectuate
Congressional purposes. 129 By 1975 however, the Court had be-
gun to severely restrict implied rights of action. 30 Ultimately,
the Court has adopted a position that "amounts to a strong
presumption against recognizing private rights of action."''
By 1980, the neutral justification for the private attorney
general had been discredited.3 2 It was believed that the special
interest groups no longer deserved special standing or compen-
sation simply because their views were uniformly seen as "good"
or "deserving of more influence" in American life.'" "What
was once non-partisan balancing has now become another form
of partisan advocacy."1
34
The current view of the private attorney general presumes
there is no imbalance of advocacy.'35 The emphasis has shifted
now to the adequacy of economic incentives to allow individuals
to vindicate legal rights that might go unenforced otherwise.
36
Under this model, incentives to litigate a particular case must be
established at a proper level to encourage the desired level of
127 Id.
'- 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (the citizen as private attorney
general was an answer to the individual's need for a "well organized political group").
129 Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Cm.
L.R. 394, 412 (1982) (citing J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (creating a
private right of action under the securities laws)). See e.g., Riggle v. California, 577
F.2d 579, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding a private right of action exists to enforce the
Rivers and Harbors Act).
- See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
,3, Sunstein, supra note 129, at 413 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
297-98 (1981)).
132 Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 360.
'" Id. at 365. See Rabkin, Public Interest Law: Is It Law in the "Public Interest, "?
8 HARv. J.L. & Pua. POL'Y 341 (1985) (the author suggests that many private attorney
general actions do not really represent the public interest but a much narrower interest
that for one reason or another was not heard in the political process).
,-' Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 360. The authors suggest that the
reason for this shift in perception is the interest groups' "grace period" is over or there
is no longer a consensus of what is right or good. Id. at 365.
' Id. at 360.
136 Id. " 'Common sense' today seems inconsistent with the idea of using attorney
fees to subsidize advocacy of views that a court feels 'ought' to be considered in reaching
a decision." Id. at 364.
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enforcement. 3 7 Citizen enforcement under the economic analysis
however, has been skewed because this model does not ade-
quately address the effect on overall regulatory enforcement by
individuals acting out of ideological motivations.'38 Professor
Blomquist argues that citizen plaintiffs under section 505 of the
CWA are very different from the private attorney general con-
cept that developed under the federal antitrust laws.' 39 Confirm-
ing this view a Justice Department official, commenting on the
tremendous increase in citizen suits, expressed concern that "cit-
izen suits may be used as a mechanism for pursuing goals that
are essentially political."' 4 Even those identified with the envi-
ronmental movement admit that citizen suits pose possible dan-
gers: "Private people can act in a venal way.'
14'
Refinement of the private attorney general concept has resulted
in the identification of two types of citizen plaintiffs: the "mer-
cenary law enforcer" whose public enforcement effort depends on
adequate attorney fee incentives and the "social advocate" whose
pursuit of litigation is "a form of pressure group activity."' 42
The tremendous increase in citizen suits by environmental
interest groups has deviated from the role Congress intended
section 505 to accomplish, which was to provide private incen-
tives for individuals to enforce the Act's requirements 43 to one
,3 Id. at 362.
,38 Comment, Private Attorneys-General Group Action In The Fight For Civil
Liberties, supra note 122, at 257; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Holfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (finding that an
economic model of the private attorney general concept- does not account for the
ideological plaintiff). For scholarly commentary supporting the constitutionality of the
"public action", see Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 130
(1968) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (stating his belief that public actions are "within the
jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution").
"19 Blomquist, supra note 36, at 389. The author argues that only under the CWA
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 and Supp.
IV, 1986)) are citizens allowed "to enforce directly penal monetary sanctions against
private polluters on behalf of the public." Id. at 368. Other environmental citizen suit
provisions are "based on a model of the citizen as a watchdog or a gadfly: spurring the
executive branch into action or enjoining clear violators of the law." Id.
,, Hookano, Private Watchdogs: Internal Auditing and External Enforcement -
Three Perspectives, [C. The Government Perspective] 17 ENVn. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10254, 10262 (July 1987). The author, Thomas E. Hookano, is Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division in the Justice Department.
"I Terris, supra note 115, at 10255.
'4, Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 356.
141 See notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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of social advocacy by politically motivated groups. Since en-
forcement is such an integral part of the basic policy of the
CWA, overenforcement of federal standards is being accom-
plished without any political accountability.
C. The Policy Effects of Citizen Suits on Government
Enforcement
Varying interpretations of the legislative purposes of citizen
suits has led to chaotic judicial treatment of citizen suits.'"
"Federal court rulings reflect widely differing views on the re-
spective roles of citizens and the government in environmental
enforcement."' 45 This leads to direct conflicts between the par-
allel enforcement efforts of citizens and the government.
Frequent citizen suits have the very real potential to "estab-
lish adverse precedent" and "inconsistent legal outcomes" in
view of the government's overriding goal of enforcing a national
clean water policy.'" The government has corroborated this view
and says their objectives of obtaining appropriate remedies and
achieving consistency in the case law can "potentially ... collide





A government attorney recently stated that citizen suits have
a potential detrimental impact on government enforcement ef-
forts in several ways:
[F]irst, by leading to inappropriate remedies in enforcement
cases; second, by diverting government enforcement resources
away from government priorities and toward the concerns of
an array of private interests; and third, by significantly shifting
"" Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law:
Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. L. REv. 220, 222 (1987).
"Substance anti process are intimately related. The procedures one uses determine how
much substance is achieved, and by whom." Id. (citing Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85).
"I Id. (there is an "inability of the courts to define precisely the relationship
between public and private enforcement mechanisms").
' Id. at 236. See infra note 220 (three-circuit split on enforcement of past viola-
tions); compare Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that a five-year statute of limitations applies) with Student Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 24 Ewv'T. REP. CAs. (BNA)
1627, 1630-31 (D.N.J.) (no statute of limitations on § 505 citizen suits).
" ' Hookano, supra note 140, at 10261.
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government resources away from enforcement and toward reg-
ulatory and administrative processes over the long term 4
Analogizing extensive citizen suit litigation to the creation of
private rights of action under statutory civil rights litigation
49
reveals serious conflicts and shortcomings with private enforce-
ment of government laws and regulations. First, statutory integ-
rity may be compromised by unanticipated levels of private
enforcement.'50 Since Congress may have carefully adjusted the
creation of a statutory right with specific sanctions for its vio-
lation and carefully chosen the enforcement mechanism to fur-
ther the goals of the statute, an unexpected bulge in one area
can subvert the regulatory program. This can result in more
enforcement than Congress intended.'
Second, agency specialization is ignored. Agencies are
equipped to make determinations through specialized, elaborate
techniques while courts are "ill-suited to resolving the sorts of
factual issues involved in regulation. ' '15 2 EPA and state permit
writers will often deal with the intricate detail of technical re-
quirements through the exercise of enforcement discretion.'"
Third, agency centralization and autonomy are lessened as
courts will likely reach different results under the same sta-
tutes. 54 Uniformity is more difficult and the like treatment of
similarly situated parties is much more difficult.'55 Judicial en-
forcement, which tends to be decentralized and which depends
on the agenda of private litigants, may also impair an agency's
ability to devise a consistent and coordinated policy of enforce-
ment.
Last, extensive citizen litigation under judicial supervision
may diminish the political accountability of those who administer
federal programs.1 6 Agencies may become less willing to tackle
I Id. EPA and the states however, have maintained a low profile despite the
increasing tide of citizen suit litigation. Gerret, Pros and Cons of Citizen Enforcement
- Citizen Suits: A Defense Perspective, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. [Current Developments]
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10162, 10162 (July, 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
,' Sunstein, supra note 129, at 416.
" Id.
152 Id.
" Garret, supra note 148, at 10163.
'" Sunstein, supra note 129, at 417.
Id. "The operation of private. incentives to litigate may result in ad hoc enforce-
ment, and in areas about which Congress was least concerned." Id.
I Id. at 418.
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sensitive enforcement cases if they believe a citizens group will
bring the action. By contrast, the courts57 and the private inter-
est groups are virtually immune from political pressures.
Thomas E. Hookano, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Justice
Department recently stated that, "while there are benefits from
citizen suits, there may be some problems which Congress may
not have foreseen."'5 " He believes that government regulatory
agencies, and the Department of Justice in particular, are "needed
to ensure that the benefits of citizen suits are maximized.
' 159
Mr. Hookano goes on to describe the interference that citizen
suits can generate:
Another concern is that citizen suit may disrupt government
enforcement activities. Federal prosecutors set enforcement pri-
orities and select particular cases with the objective of pro-
moting an overall enforcement strategy based on maximizing
deterrence. Cases are selected with a view toward establishing
favorable precedents of national applicability, developing some
areas of law, and avoiding others.
Citizen suits, on the other hand, tend to address specific local
or regional problems, with little regard to the needs of the
national law enforcement scheme .... They force government
prosecutors to become involved in cases that they may have
preferred to handle at a different time in a different way, or
not at all. At times there are fact patterns that do not favor
legal theories that the government would like to establish or
preserve. In essence, such suits preempt the government's pros-
ecutorial discretion. 60
Although Congress has explicitly granted citizens a private
right of action under section 505 to enforce the CWA, extensive
citizen litigation has the potential to "frustrate statutory pur-
poses by allowing litigants to bypass the administrative process
entirely and permitting the nature and extent of enforcement to
be dictated by the judiciary." ' 161 The agency's authority to make
law and policy is thus disrupted.
"5 Id.
'5' Hookano, supra note 140, at 10262.
I" ld.
'6 Id.
161 Id. at 414.
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
D. The Citizen as Policy-Maker
A sophisticated model has emerged that defines environmen-
tal policy by reference to the interaction of substantive policy as
evidenced in statutes and regulations with enforcement proce-
dures.162 The nature of a substantive policy such as the one
developed under the CWA is thus determined by the enforcement
process. 163 Under this model, enforcement efforts are a part of
the policy making process and the level of enforcement "defines
the environmental result of the statute, and thus, its basic pol-
icy.,, 164
A model that finds enforcement integral to the ultimate
nature of one's right leads to the inevitable conclusion that
citizens have become policy-makers under section 505:
If citizen suits are merely an additional method of enforcing
the environmental laws, as [a] 'naive' model suggests, then
there would be little point in allowing citizens to sue once a
source had ceased violating the environmental laws. If how-
ever, citizen-plaintiffs are part of the substantive policy-making
process, as a more sophisticated approach suggests, then they
should be permitted to sue for past violations as long as the
suit will deter the defendant (and possibly other violators) from
violating the relevant environmental standards in the future.
By performing this function, citizen plaintiffs, as citizen poli-
cymakers, would help determine what constitutes optimal levels
of compliance with the environmental laws.
65
The problem with this result is that Congress never intended
section 505 to be used by citizens as a "mechanism for policy-
making.' 166 "The government is the principal policymaker. It
can, better than a citizen who is concerned about one particular
violator, understand and resolve the conflicting economic and
environmental goals of the statutes.'
' 67
162 Comment, supra note 144, at 222.
163 Cohen and Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
167, 192-93 (1985).
' Comment, supra note 144, at 235 (citation omitted).
161 Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
166 Id. at 260, n.246 (citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, reprinted
in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 436-39
(1974) (stating that "courts would merely apply factual record developed when standards
were originally set, before any permits were issued; thus, there would be no inconsistent
policy).
,67 Comment, supra note 144, at 255.
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Environmental regulations are overinclusive by their very
nature. 16 This situation will result in overenforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations if they are enforced in their entirety.
Moreover, this is the case where citizen suit plaintiffs have shown
a tendency to press for the maximum enforcement available.
Often, regulatory beneficiaries may prefer different types and
amounts of enforcement in collective interests such as clean
water.169 This will lead to overenforcement by those ideological
plaintiffs who want more than most. 170 Since citizen plaintiffs
are motivated by their own chosen agenda, they no longer "have
[the] 'impartial' and 'unprejudiced' motives of a public prose-
cutor." 17'
The government's perception of the "public interest" is
broader than that of the environmental interest groups. 7 2 The
interest groups' apparent insulation from politics under a private
enforcement model leads to the appearance of the role as "a
means to promote law enforcement independently without con-
fronting political issues." 73 Because government goals are often
different from narrow private interests, citizen suit litigation
"may not provide the same opportunity as a government suit to
instigate broader policy changes." 1 74 Although Congress explic-
itly provided for citizen enforcement and courts must recognize
and enforce rights of action that Congress has created, there is
no indication that such enforcement was designed to replace the
government as the principle policymaker.
Professor Blomquist has recently stated that aggressive en-
forcement of the CWA has certain costs associated with it:
16 Id. Environmental rules are "overinclusive because it is too costly to obtain the
accurate information needed to create an optimal rule that sets the level of allowable
emissions at the point where the cost of meeting that standard is equal to the social cost
of pollution at that level." Id. at 258.
I9 Sunstein, supra note 129, at 436.
170 Id.
171 Comment, supra note 162, at 257 (citing Ward, Private Prosecution - The
Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1171, 1173 (1972)).
572 Id. (citing DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative
Process: Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Directive for Further Research,
1977 DuKE L.J. 409, 439).
173 Garth, Nagel and Plager, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing the role of the private
attorney general).
171 Comment, supra note 144, at 254 (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("government's interest in protecting 'lands which it
holds in trust for all the people' is distinct form private party's interest in title to land")).
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[Iun the course of the working of the citizen suit provisions of
the Clean Water Act, the goals of vigorous enforcement and
recovery of maximum monetary penalties against polluters have
been pursued by unusually muscular means: authorizing private
citizens to assume the powers and prerogatives of government
prosecutors. But realization of the Congressional goals of in-
creased enforcement and imposition of stiff monetary penalties
is being purchased at great cost: the sacrifice of other goals,
the sacrifice of means that could be used to serve these other
goals, and increased economic costs to the private and public
sectors. 17
In order to achieve desired social goals, it is important to main-
tain the proper balance between government enforcement and
the private sector. It is also important to avoid the adverse
consequences of having this balance shift too far toward private
enforcement.
E. Citizen Involvement
Since 1984 there has been a dramatic increase in the number
of citizen suits filed under the CWA.' 76 This increase is attributed
to a number of causes, with a decrease in federal enforcement
during the Reagan Administration the most prominently men-
tioned. 77 Most of these suits have been for violations of the
discharger's NPDES permit.' 
7
In 1983 and early 1984, 195 suits and notices of intent to
sue under section 505 were filed by citizens, almost five times
the number filed during the previous five years. 179 Between 1984
and 1987, 800 notices of intent to sue had been filed.8 0 The
explosion of citizen enforcement action has been viewed with
"I Blomquist, supra note 36, at 406-07.
,,6 See e.g., Fadil, supra note 92, at 23; Meier, "Citizen Suits" Become a Popular
Weapon in the Fight Against Industrial Polluters, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1987 at 11, col.
4.
177 Comment, supra note 144, at 233. See also infra note 198 and accompanying
text.
178 Price, supra note 39, at 31.
171 Note, supra note 83, at 195 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, CITIZEN
SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT AcTIoNs UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED
STATUTES III-10 (fig. D.) (1984)). Citizens had begun only 41 actions between 1978 and
1983.
" Garrett, U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling in Gwaltney Case Marks Watershed in
Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws, ENV'T. REP. (BNA) [Current Develop-
ments] 2027 (Jan. 15, 1988).
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alarm by industry' and was recently acknowledged by Con-
gress. I8 2 Citizen suits are now being filed at a rate that almost
exceeds government enforcement actions.8 3 In fact, citizens suits
have generated most of the reported cases under the CWA, and
the majority of those have been in favor of the citizens.'84
While the citizen suit provision states that citizens will bring
suit on their own behalf, in reality, national environmental groups
have initiated the great majority of litigation under section 505
of the CWA. 15 Often, individual citizens are nominal co-plain-
tiffs in order to satisfy constitutional standing requirements.'
6
In the last five years, several well-known environmental groups
including the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council
and Friends of the Earth as well as several regional groups,
8 7
have led a nationwide campaign of citizen enforcement of the
CWA.188 The effort began in New York and New Jersey, two
states with strong environmental programs, 18 9 and has "spread
throughout the country."190
-8 Id. (permit holders viewed these suits with feelings of alarm and skepticism).
1,2 During consideration of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1985, the Senate
Committee on Environmental and Public Works concluded: "In the past two years, the
number of citizen suits to enforce NPDES permits has surged so that such suits now
constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement actions filed in Federal court under
this Act." Clean Water Act Amendments of 1985, S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
28 (1985).
283 Note, supra note 83, at 195. See generally Miller, supra note 3; Moore, Private
Suits Flood Companies Under Clean Water Provision, Legal Times, May 7, 1984, at 1,
col. 2.
I" Powers, A Citizen's View of Gwaltney, 18 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Institute)
10119, 10122 (April, 1988).
85 Note, supra note 64, at 1659 n.17. "Such groups are primarily responsible for
the explosion of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act." Id. (quoting Fadil, supra
note 92, at 31). It has been speculated that lax enforcement by EPA of the CWA under
the Reagan Administration has prompted this reliance on citizen suits. See Miller, Private
Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part III, 14 EwvTI. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10407, 10424 (Nov. 1984).
"8I Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (requiring that every plaintiff,
whether an individual citizen or an environmental group, must show an "injury in fact"
to meet Art. III standing requirements).
"8 Most prominently the Student Public Interest Research Groups of New York
and New Jersey and The Chesapeake Bay Foundation.
288 T. L. Garrett, supra note 180, at 2027.
289 New York and New Jersey "were ranked among the top states in efforts to
establish and enforce environmental programs, according to a report released by the
Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment." HAzARDous WASTE AND Toxic
TORTS LAW & STF.ATEcY, Vol. 3, No. 10, March 1988, at 2.
" T. L. Garrett, supra note 180, at 2027.
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One of the most attractive aspects of the citizen suit provision
is that it allows an environmental group to set its own enforce-
ment priorities. Often citizens pursue enforcement against a pol-
luter whom the regulatory authority has chosen not to
prosecute. 91 Although this is warmly embraced by some EPA
administrators,'9 2 it would appear to put the citizen firmly in the
role of choosing the level of deterrence applied under the Act,
which is clearly a policy decision. These enforcement actions
mark a distinct change in the environmental groups' agendas
from one of seeking new laws to a policy that includes enforce-
ment of existing laws. 93 This change has led to a shift in the
deterrence policy of the citizen suit that was at least downplayed
by Congress when enacting the CWA. 94
F. Reasons for Increased Level of Citizen Enforcement
Senator Hart, in remarks made about another citizen suit
provision, 95 said:
[The citizen suit provision] therefore provides no incentives to
suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those suing
and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than
the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial
gain and the very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate
court action under this bill. 96
"I, Price, supra note 39, at 32. The reality of an agency's finite resources often
prevents it from taking enforcement action against every violation of which it is aware.
Id.
192 Id. at 61 (quoting EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus in a July 30,
1984, policy memo: "EPA values the efforts of citizen groups..."). Mr. Ruckelshaus
also directed EPA Regional Offices to continue to cooperate with citizen requests for
information (primarily DMRs) on dischargers' violations of the CWA. Id. But cf. notes
140 and 147-48 and accompanying text.
,91 See Babich and Hanson, supra note 74, at 10165; see also Fadil, supra note 92,
at 23-24; Meier, supra note 176, at 17, col. 4; Comment, supra note 144, at 221-22
("[a]lthough environmentalists may believe the present statutes are inadequate, they
recognize that passage of stricter requirements would be meaningless unless the present
laws are enforced").
" See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
19, Senator Hart was discussing the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act; cf.
supra note 4, upon which § 505 of the CWA is modeled. See Note, supra note 64, at
1656.
" Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing 116 CoNG. REc. 33104 (1970)).
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Recent environmental plaintiff activity would suggest that
citizen suits are utilized neither rarely nor secondarily.' 97 A
high level EPA official has suggested three reasons for the
high level of citizen initiated litigation:
(1) persistent noncompliance by some members of the regulated
community;
(2) the compilation and public availability of facilities' self-
monitoring reports as evidence of violations; and
(3) availablility of civil penalties through Clean Water Act
citizen suits. 9
A fourth reason could be added to the list - the ability of a
successful or partially successful plaintiff to recover attorney's
fees.' 99 And contrary to Senator Hart's belief, citizen enforcers
are not likely to lose money by suing to punish polluters.
In fact, in 1983 alone, environmental attorneys recovered as
attorney's fees more than 400 percent of civil penalty amounts
paid to the United States Treasury in those same citizen enforce-
ment suits.1°0 Thus, the modern environmental bounty hunter's
reward seems out of proportion to the amount he benefits society
if civil penalties are in any way related to the damage done to
the environment.
Another major reason why section 505 has attracted so much
public interest litigation is because the enforcement cases are so
easy to win. 20' The single most important factor in identifying
and proving noncompliance is the discharger's own self-moni-
toring data - the Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR). 20 DMRs
19 The legislative history of the citizen suit provision and the CWA has indicated
Congress expected the citizen's role to be secondary to the government's. See supra notes
81-85 and 92-93 and accompanying text.
"' Price, supra note 39, at 32.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982). This concept is known as fee shifting and requires
the losing party to pay the prevailing party's attorney fees. This statute allows citizen
suit plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney and expert witness fees where appropriate.
Comment, supra note 144, at 231. See Note, Attorney Fee Shifting; A Roadmap for the
Unwary - The SMCRA Example, 4 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 159, 160 (1988) (authored by
W. Gorton).
Lewis, Environmentalists' Authority To Sue Industry For Civil Penalties Is
Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10101, 10102.
2o Note, supra note 64, at 1657 n.119. Observing that citizen enforcers face only
a very slight risk of losing CWA suits and recovering attorney's fees in cases where the
discharger's DMRs show obvious violations.
, See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. See also Schwartz and Hackett,
supra note 84, at 327.
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represent a detailed self-policing scheme on a discharger's per-
formance and compliance with the Act. 2 3 Most courts have




while a few have allowed limited defenses. 20 5 Citizen victories
are not difficult, despite the courts' first adjustment to the Act
which required strict compliance with requirements of the statute
in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers Association.206 This holding was consistent with the Su-
preme Court's previous environmental decisions requiring a
narrow reading and rigid adherence to the plain meaning of the
statute.
207
2' Price, supra note 39, at 33. In completing these reports for regular submission
to the regulatory authority under the terms of its NPDES permit, the permit holder lists
both the effluent requirement he must meet and the actual laboratory results of the
sampling performed. This system results in easy comparisons and one may determine
immediately whether the discharger has violated an effluent limit or permit condition.
Id.
r See e.g., Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600
F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985). "Reports or records which are required to be kept by law
... may be used as admissions to establish a defendant's civil liability" (emphasis
added). Id. at 1485. See also Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir.
1987), vacated on other grounds 56 U.S.L.W. 3607 (1988); Student Pub. Interest Res.
Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1538 (D.N.J. 1984)
(rejecting defendant's argument that their DMRs were inaccurate or unreliable).
- See e.g. Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532, 536
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (typographical errors might be challenged); Connecticut Fund for the
Environment v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1417 n.33 (D. Conn. 1987) (clerical or
typographical errors might be challenged successfully).
No reported CWA case has involved the challenge of the admissibility of DMRs in
a criminal conviction under the Act. However, it it almost certain that the "required
records" exception would defeat the protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment
against self-incrimination. In Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court
held the government has a right to require a person to maintain records under regulatory
schemes and the government may compel production of these records and use them in
a criminal prosecution. The high Court went on to define the limits of this exception in
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (requiring that purpose of record
retention be essentially regulatory; information sought to be obtained must be of a kind
the regulated party customarily keeps; and the records must have assumed "public
aspects").
453 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring that citizens suing under § 505 must comply with
specified procedures). See also Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that compliance with 60-day notice provision is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to citizen suits under the CWA); Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 27 Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 1590 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (notice to one defendant does not impute notice to other
defendants).
11 See e.g. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (see supra note 96); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) ("[tjhe fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in
the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the
[VOL. 5:257
1989-901 ENVIRONMENTAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
Most citizen suits have been settled before a trial on the
merits. 20 8 Suits are settled by consent decrees between the alleged
violator and the environmental group. 2°9 If the trial court has
jurisdiction, it must approve the decree once a complaint is
filed. 210 As a practical matter, if a citizen suit is threatened or
likely, a discharger that has violated the Act should negotiate a
consent decree, through a court, as part of the settlement of any
administrative action. A company would be well advised to
initiate contact with a regulatory agency to arrange a consent
decree that would cover any previous five-year period to fore-
close a citizen suit for past violations if the discharge point is
likely to remain in non-compliance for any period in the future.
Under the 1987 Amendments, this will foreclose a citizen suit
under section 505.
Previously, environmental groups would often secure dona-
tions to their favorite causes as part of a settlement with a
discharger and one defendant was even required to run a full
page advertisement in the Los Angeles Times stating it had
violated the law and "got caught. ' ' 21' In 1983, 90 percent of all
civil penalty amounts paid in settlements or litigation by citizens
were made to environmental groups rather than the federal
guise of judicial review" (emphasis in original)); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) ("the
separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by
judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal' ").
m L. JORGENSON AND J. KIMMEL, supra note 55, at 17; Galloway, supra note 76,
at 7A.12.
Id. Often, consent decrees include: a statement by the discharger declining to
admit liability for any violations; an agreement to provide future monitoring reports to
the environmental group; limitations on citizen suits for future violations; stipulated
penalty terms for failure to comply with the decree and future violations and procedural
terms such as jurisdiction and venue for any future litigation covering anything in the
original complaint or consent decree. Id.
110 In approving the decree, the court must find that it it consistent with the statute
being enforced, that its terms are fair and equitable, and that it has been agreed upon
and entered into in good faith. Galloway, supra note 76, at 7A.12-7A.13; see Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 13 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 20975 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2, Hazardous Waste and Toxic Torts Law & Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1987,
at 2; See Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 656 F. Supp. 513 (W.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd 834 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendant would make a $49,000 contribution
to the Conservation Foundation to be used in projects reasonably related to the protec-
tion of water quality); Student Pub. Interest Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Tenneco
Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394 (F.N.J. 1985) (defendant to make a $255,000 contri-
bution to the American Littoral Society Inc. for projects in the Delaware River Basin).
See generally Environmental Penalties and Environmental Trusts, 17 ENvTL. L. REP.
(Envtl. Law Institute) 10356 (Sept. 1987) (observing that settlements in CWA cases often
result in contributions to environmentally beneficial projects in lieu of penalties).
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government. 212 The Justice Department has taken the position
that such contributions, which are not paid to the U.S. Treasury,
cannot be considered the payment of a civil penalty and do not
bar future enforcement actions and claims for penalties.
213
The 1987 Amendments to the CWA included a provision for
the government to evaluate any proposed consent decree between
the discharger and the citizen so that it may "protect the interests
of the United States. ' 214 This is further evidence of Congres-
sional displeasure with some citizen suit efforts and a contraction
of citizens' enforcement freedoms.
III. GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD, LTD. V. CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUNDATION 2 15
It was said at the time of the decision that "[b]y any reck-
oning, Gwaltney must be the citizen enforcement case of the
decade, if not the century.1 216 Both the regulated community
and environmentalists claimed a victory27 in the Supreme Court's
2 Lewis, supra note 200, at 10102.
211 Price, supra note 39 at 59.
2" 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(c)(3) (West Supp. 1988). This recently enacted section
provides that no consent decree shall be entered in a citizen enforcement case without
45 days prior notice to the United States Attorney General and the Administrator of
EPA.
" Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
For the purposes of discussing and clearly distinguishing the five reported Gwaltney
decisions from the trial court through the Supreme Court and back down on remand,
the following system will be used: Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) [hereinafter Gwaltney 1] (the trial court's
decision); Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Gwaltney I7 (affirming the trial court); Gwaltney, 108 S.
Ct. 376 (1987) [hereinafter Gwaltney III] (the Supreme court opinion and the most often
cited); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170
(1988) [hereinafter Gwaltney IP] (the 4th Circuit's opinion on remand); Chesapeake Bay
Foundation Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 4th Cir.
1988) [hereinafter Gwaltney VJ (the trial court's opinion on remand).
216 Miller, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.:
Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, 18 EN-vTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Institute) 10098,
10098 (March 1988).
2I See Taylor, Citizens' Suits in Pollution Cases are Limited, New York Times,
Dec. 2, 1987, at A24; Duboff and Clearwater, Arguing for the Defense after Gwaltney,
18 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Institute) 10123, 10123 (April 1988). However, some
attorneys for environmental groups and some representing industry have expressed their
disappointment at the decision. See Powers, supra note 184, at 10122 (expressing the
view that the decision reverses the recent trend of "relatively streamlined" litigation
under citizen suit provisions); Schatzow, High Court Decision on Water Pollution:
Taking Middle Road? Legal Times, Dec. 21, 1987, 15, at 16 (industry attorneys disap-
pointed).
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opinion in the recent citizen suit case in Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.218 These claims are
symptomatic of the confusion which plagues the law of citizen
suit litigation even after the landmark Gwaltney decision. Both
groups, however, agree on one issue - the decision will increase
the amount of motion practice and delay involved in environ-
mental citizen suit litigation .219
The decision in Gwaltney resolved a three-way split among
the federal circuit courts of appeal, 220 by holding that section
505 of the Clean Water Act 221 does not confer subject matter
jurisdiction over citizen suits based on "wholly past" violations
of the Act. 222 While there have been other citizens suit cases to
reach the Supreme Court, Gwaltney was the first to reach the
Court on the purely jurisdictional scope of the citizen suit pro-
vision.
223
218 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
239 Powers, supra note 184, at 10119; Miller, supra note 217, at 10104 ("[Tlhe
court, in its more modest way, has been kind to litigating attorneys").
220 The Fifth Circuit in 1985 became the first court of appeals to interpret § 505
expressly. Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Hamker court affirmed a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction holding
that citizen suits are authorized only where plaintiffs allege a current, ongoing violation
of an effluent standard limitation or order and that the section authorized only civil
penalties and injunctive relief for these "current" violations. 756 F.2d at 396. The
Fourth Circuit expressly rejected Hamker and concluded that § 505 authorized actions
for wholly past violations, even if such violations were not continuing at the time the
complaint was filed. Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd., 791
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986). The First Circuit took a position midway between the other
two circuits, holding that jurisdiction lies under § 505 when "the citizen-plaintiff fairly
alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again proceed to
violate the Act." Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094
(1st Cir. 1986).
n' Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments § 505, 33 U.S.C. 1365 (1982).
Congress amended § 505 in 1987. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the major litigation discussed in this Note rests on the earlier version. References
in this Note to the CWA will be to the earlier version unless specifically noted.
108 S. Ct. at 384-385.
2 See generally Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that there is no implied cause of action under
the Clean Water Act); International Paper Company v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
(holding the Clean Water Act preempted Vermont nuisance law to the extent that the
law sought to impose liability on a New York point source); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680 (1983) (citizens' group that failed to achieve some degree of success on the
merits of its citizen suit under the Clean Air Act was held not entitled to attorneys fees);
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (held that an EPA
implementation plan that allowed individual variances from state ambient air quality
standards was permissible).
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The decision in Gwaltney has spawned a litany of views,
predictions and interpretations of its holding and the future of
citizen suits in general. 224 Although Gwaltney resolved a hotly
litigated issue, it represents only the latest in a series of mid-
course corrections that affect the balance of power between
private citizens and the government in the enforcement of the
Clean Water Act.
A. Gwaltney I
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., a meat processor and packer
of the famous Smithfield hams, discharged effluent under a valid
NPDES permit into the Pagan River near Smithfield, Virginia.
225
For three years prior to the citizen suit, Gwaltney had exceeded
its effluent limitations on several occasions. 22 These violations
were listed in their DMRs filed with the Virginia regulatory
authority.
227
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and The Natural Resources
Defense Council sent the requisite sixty-day notice to Gwaltney
in February 1984, based on its reported violations in the filed
DMRs. Gwaltney installed new equipment that completely cor-
rected its violations by May 15, 1984. The environmental groups
filed their citizen suit June 15, 1984.228
The court denied Gwaltney's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that it was in complete
compliance with its NPDES permit when the suit was filed. 229
The district court held that section 505 authorized civil penalty
actions for wholly past violations, and alternatively held that
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Gwaltney continued to
violate effluent limitations at the time the complaint was filed.
230
" See e.g., supra notes 217 and 219 and accompanying text.
Gwaltney I, 611 F. Supp. at 1544. Gwaltney discharged wastewater from its
production facility under NPDES Permit No. VA0002844. Id., at n.1.
" Pollutant limits exceeded were (1) fecal coliform; (2) chlorine (CL,); (3) total
suspended solids (TSS); (4) total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) (the most frequent violations);
and (5) oil and grease. 611 F. Supp. at 1544 n.2. For a complete breakdown of all its
violations, see Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1566 (appendix A).
Id. at 1545.
In Appendix E of Petition for Certiorari (Complaint and Stipulations) [hereinafter
Brief] at 79a), Gwaltney 11, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
Gwaltney I, 611 F. Supp. at 1548-50.
230 Id. The speed at which liability was established in this case merits notice. As
mentioned, the complaint was filed June 15, 1984. Six weeks later, on July 25, plaintiffs
[VOL. 5:257
ENVIRONMENTAL BOUNTY HUNTERS
The district court noted specifically that it was not bound
by the EPA Penalty Policy or by the penalties that EPA would
seek were it prosecuting the case. Even though the court did
later use the Policy as a "guideline," such independence on the
part of the federal courts is directly contrary to nationwide
consistency of remedies and actually gives citizens the ability to
extract larger penalties than the Justice Department could in the
same case. The court then assessed a civil penalty in the amount
of $1,285,322 plus interest from the date of judgment. 2 1
B. Gwaltney II
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that
section 505 of the CWA conferred subject matter jurisdiction
on wholly past violations. 232 The court emphasized that a signif-
icant deterrent would be lost under any other interpretation of
the Act. 233 The court rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.234 and never
reached the district court's alternative reasoning on the good
faith allegation of the violation.
C. Gwaltney III
The Supreme Court reversed both lower courts in an opinion
by Justice Marshall and held that the citizen suit provision in
section 505 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over
wholly past violations of the CWA. 235 The Court based its con-
clusion on the use of the present tense language in section 505
requiring a defendant be "alleged to be in violation" of the
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Brief, supra note 228, at DOCKET
ENTRIES, p. 2. One month later, on August 28, 1984, the court heard plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id. The motion was granted in favor of the
plaintiffs on the issue of liability during a hearing that lasted only 21 minutes. Id. The
trial on the amount of penalty was held December 19, 1984, and lasted only five hours
and 36 minutes. Id. Thus defendant's liability for civil penalties in excess of $1.2 million
was established in slightly more than six months.
"I' Gwaltney 1, 611 F. Supp. at 1565.
232 Gwaltney II, 791 F.2d 304, 316-17 (4th Cir. 1986).
233 Id. at 309-10 ("a significant deterrent would be lost if citizen suits seeking civil
penalties for past violations were not permitted").
114 Id. at 309 (discussing Hamker, 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985), for a discussion
of this case, see supra note 220).
Gwaltney III, 108 S. Ct. 376, 383-85 (1987) (J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall,
joined by C.J. Rehnquist, and J. Blackmun).
1989-90]
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Act. 236 On this point, the Court rejected an interpretation that
environmental groups claimed to be critical to citizen enforce-
ment efforts. 237 However, the Court struck a balance between
those who argued it would be impossible to determine whether
a polluter was "in violation" on the day suit is filed, and those
urging an even narrower reading of the statute to foreclose any
action by a citizen against a violation occurring prior to the
filing of a suit. The Court held that to establish subject matter
jurisdiction, a citizen must "make a good faith allegation of
continuous or intermittent violations. ' 238 The Court did indicate
that "longstanding principles of mootness" and Rule 11 sanc-
tions were available to protect the defendant's interests against
non-meritorious litigation.
23 9
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring, de facto dissenting, opin-
ion. 240 He argued that the majority's test for standing was "ut-
terly unique" and that a defendant should be able to challenge
the sufficiency of the allegations as well as the accuracy of the
jurisdictional facts alleged. 241 He disagreed sharply with the ma-
jority on the issue to be resolved by the Court of Appeals on
remand. The majority directed the lower court to determine
whether the plaintiff had made the "good faith allegation"
required. 242 Justice Scalia argued that the issue was whether the
defendant was in fact "in violation" on the date suit was
brought .
243
236 Id. at 384 (observing that the statutory requirement of "in violation" cannot be
fairly read to include "wholly past" violations).
137 The Sierra Club has argued in its petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied 484 U.S. 985 (1987), that the Fifth Circuit's approach in Hamker "effectively
nullified" citizens' enforcement rights. 18 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 1931 [Current Develop-
ments] (Dec. 18, 1987). The lower court in Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, ruled a citizen suit
based on multiple, sporadic, and past violations of effluent limitations contained in
NPDES permits cannot be maintained under FWPCA § 505.
238 Gwaltney III, 108 S. Ct. at 385-86.
119 Id. at 385-86.
Gwaltney 111, 108 S. Ct. at 386-88 (J. Scalia, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, joined by J. Stevens and J. O'Conner).
2' Id. at 387. Justice Scalia said "I can think of no other context in which, in
order to carry a lawsuit to judgment, allegations are necessary but proof of those
allegations (if they are contested) is not." Id.
,2 Id. at 386. "[A] suit will not be dismissed for lack of standing if there are
sufficient 'allegations of fact' - not proof - in the complaint or supporting affidavits."
Id. ((citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Art. III's requirement remains:
the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself. ) (emphasis
added)). Id. at n.5.
143 Id. at 387. Justice Scalia suggested that the question on remand should be
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Nothwithstanding the disagreement over the role of the lower
courts on remand, the Court was unanimous in holding that the
use of the present tense in section 505 is pervasive, indicating
"the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the
present or the future, not in the past." 2" The Court relied in
part on the legislative history of the Act to support this conclu-
sion. It stated that the citizen suit provisions were described as
abatement or injunctive provisions, clearly indicating prospective
relief and noted that it was modeled after section 304 of the
Clean Air Act which provided for wholly injunctive relief. 24
The Court went on to comment that the sixty-day notice
provision to both the violator and the government would be
meaningless if citizens were allowed to sue for past violations.
2
4
The purpose of the notice was to provide an opportunity for the
discharger to comply and make a lawsuit unnecessary.
247
The majority in Gwaltney III characterized the citizen's role
as supplementing rather than supplanting government actions.
2 48
The Court felt that if citizens were permitted to sue for wholly
past violations, there was a danger that such suits would interfere
with the government's enforcement and prosecutorial func-
tions.249 The Court concluded that they could not agree with the
environmental groups' view of the nature of the citizens' role,
one that would change that role from "interstitial to potentially
intrusive.' '250
Thus the Supreme Court swung the pendulum of power back
toward the government agencies and away from the citizen. Their
opinion expresses a real fear that citizens had expanded the role
of section 505 to oust the government of its regulatory role. This
is a significant realignment of the parties and one that clearly
whether the defendant had taken sufficient remedial steps that had clearly achieved the
effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was brought. Id.
, Gwaltney III, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
N5 Id.
246 Id. at 384. But cf. Miller, supra note 216, at 10100-01 (observing that many
violators cannot achieve compliance within this time period and that the notice provision
serves other purposes as well).
ul Gwaltney III, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.
Id. at 383. The Court said this intent was evidenced by the bar on citizen suits
where the government has taken action. Id.
u, Id. The Court pointed out that the government's discretion to enforce the Act
in the public interest would be curtailed since the government may choose to forego or
compromise penalties as part of its enforcement strategy.
250 Id.
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indicates it is the government's role to punish and deter and the
citizen's role to correct.
D. Gwaltney IV
On remand to the Fourth Circuit, the Appeals Court ad-
dressed two issues. In a terse paragraph, the Court held that the
"district court did find a good faith allegation of ongoing vio-
lation sufficient to avoid threshhold jurisdictional challenges." ' 25'
The Court also remanded to the district court the question as to
whether the plaintiffs had proved "the existence of an ongoing
violation (continuous or intermittent) in order to prevail.' '252
The Appeals Court suggested that the plaintiffs may accom-
plish this by either of two methods. First, the plaintiffs may
prevail by proving that the alleged violations did continue on or
after the date the complaint was filed.253 Alternatively, the plain-
tiffs could adduce "evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence of inter-
mittent or sporadic violations."
25 4
The second portion of the court's test is troubling. It appears
to contradict Justice Marshall's statement that "after the plain-
tiff offers evidence to support the allegation, the case proceeds
to trial on the merits, where the plaintiff must prove the alle-
gations in order to prevail.
'255
The standard allows a factfinder much more latitude and
changes his inquiry from the objective issue of whether a vio-
lation occurred to a choice between competing experts as to the
potential for the violation to occur in the future. This would
seem to be an appropriate question in the context of injunctive
relief. However, as a threshold for millions of dollars of civil
penalties to be imposed, a serious potential for abuse is present.
Only in equitable proceedings for injunctions does the future
"I Gwaltney IV, 844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988). The court also held the District
Court's finding was "not clearly erroneous." Id.
252 Id. (rebutting Justice Scalia's suggestion that the majority would never require
a plaintiff be called on to prove the jurisdictional allegation).
253 Id.
, Id. at 171-72. The court noted that "[ilntermittent or sporadic violations do not
cease to be ongoing until the date when there is not real likelihood of repetition." Id.
151 Gwaltney III, 108 S. Ct. 376, 386 (1987). Justice Marshall was distinguishing
the challenges to the allegation required to sustain standing from those challenges to the
merits of the case. Id.
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potential conduct of an actor play a part in his liability for past
conduct.
E. Gwaltney V
On remand, the district court was forced to consider the
second part of the Appeals Court's test, as Gwaltney had not
violated its NPDES permit since the citizen suit was filed. 216 As
expected, the district court's opinion was mainly concerned with
expert testimony offered at trial concerning the likelihood of
continued compliance. The court held that sufficient evidence
had been presented at the trial to demonstrate that "at the time
plaintiffs filed suit, there existed a very real danger and likeli-
hood of further violation.1
25 7
Thus the court ruled that the original judgment of the trial
court for a total civil penalty of $1,285,322 be reinstated,
258
despite the fact that the penalty was for violations that occurred
before the filing of the citizen suit and the fact that Gwaltney
had not violated any effluent standard or order since the suit
was filed.
F. Gwaltney VI
Gwaltney once again appealed the finding that it was "in
violation" at the time suit was brought under the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney III. Gwaltney proved that there
was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the district
court's finding of ongoing violations of TKN limits and espe-
cially chlorine limits. 2 9 In what has become known as a param-
2 Gwaltney V, 688 F. Sulop. 1078, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1988). In conjunction with the
second element of the test in the Fourth Circuit's remand opinion, the district court also
relied heavily on the appeals court's observation that violations "do not cease to be
ongoing until the date when there is no real likelihood of repetition." Id. at 1079 (citing
Gwaltney IV, 844 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir. 1988)).
2 Id. at 1079. This proof consisted of statements by one of the plaintiff's witnesses,
Dr. Bell, who "had clear doubts ... about continued compliance" and the defendant's
witness, Mr. Sheed, who, when asked on cross examination whether there was some
doubt, innocuously replied: "I think there is some doubt every year that you would
expect the plant to go out of compliance at some time." Id. at n.3.
2I Id. at 1080.
9 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., (Gwaltney
VI), 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989).
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eter by parameter approach, 260 the Court held "that the district
court had no jurisdiction to impose penalties for Gwaltney's
wholly past chlorine violations." ' 261 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the original judgment and remanded the case once again,
this time with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment
against Gwaltney for $289,822, the penalty amount attributable
to the TKN violations only. 262 The Court also held that the
imposition of penalties for past violations which were linked to
the same parameter with an ongoing violation deterred future
pollution and thus presented a live case or controversy under
Article III standing requirements.
263
IV. POST-GWALTNEY CITIZEN SUIT LITIGATION
Gwaltney has raised more questions than answers, certainly
more than can be adequately addressed here, and its actual
impact may not be known for years. However, it has already
become one of the most cited CWA cases in little more than a
year. It has been applied to citizen suits under the Clean Air
Act, 264 and used as authority that Rule 11 should be used to
protect defendants from actions premised on baseless allega-
tions.265 It has also been used to reject challenges to standing
based on certain allegations.
266
The major battle on "wholly past violations" is over. How-
ever, despite the Supreme Court's unanimous holding on that
m6 This approach views violations of different parameters under a discharge permit
as separate violations for jurisdictional purposes. Thus it is necessary for an environ-
mental plaintiff to plead and prove an ongoing violation of each discharge parameter in
order to impose penalties for violations of that parameter. The Court in Gwaltney VI
rejected a permit approach that would have allowed the imposition of penalties for any
current or past violations of any parameter as long as the plaintiff proved at least one
violation of a limit established in the discharge permit. Gwaltney VI 890 F.2d at 698
(This "theory... runs against the reasoning of the Supreme Court in finding that there
must be an ongoing violation to create subject matter jurisdiction.").
26, Gwaltney VI, 890 F.2d at 698.
' Id.
Id. at 695.
'6, See Moran v. Vaccaro, 684 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the
Clean Air Act contains the same language as the CWA, that a defendant be "alleged
to be in violation" before a citizen suit can go forward and will bar citizen plaintiffs in
CAA cases unless this requirement is met).
' See International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146, 150
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
" See Books on Tape, Inc. v. Booktape Corp., 836 F.2d 519, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(reversing a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that had confused a
petitioner's standing with merits of the case).
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issue, the focus has turned to just what a wholly past violation
is. In what appears to be a clear misreading of Gwaltney III,
the Fourth Circuit at least has said that ending violations before
the citizen suit is filed does not necessarily make a past viola-
tion. 267 It is clear, however, that some types of actions brought
in the past would not be allowed under the Gwaltney holdings.
26
1
One case currently winding its way through the Supreme
Court's docket, Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc. ,269 raises
a number of challenges, both to the correct application of Gwalt-
ney III and the constitutional dimension of standing in citizen
suits. 270 The case squarely raises the issue of whether civil pen-
alties under section 505 meets the Article III standing require-
ment of "redressability" by authorizing the penalties to be paid
to the United States Treasury. 271 Also raised is the issue of
whether the failure to file DMRs, without evidence that any
effluent limitation was violated, is within the scope of the juris-
dictional requirement of the citizen suit provision.
As manifested in Simkins Industries, Gwaltney III is likely
to spawn a number of challenges to section 505 on the standing
issue, especially in light of the Scalia concurrence. Justice Scalia
seems to draw an important distinction between a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)272 and a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1). 273 Justice Scalia argues that the "good faith alle-
267 See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
6 See e.g., Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1091
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987) (the facility's discharge system was
connected to a municipal treatment facility before the citizen suit was commenced);
Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 24 ENVT. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1993
(N.D.N.Y. 1986) (facility's previous owner held liable for violations occurring after he
shut down and sold the plant); Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey
v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (D.N.J. 1985) (prior to citizen suit,
the defendant had connected his discharge to a nonpolluting municipal treatment facility);
Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 712 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1983) (no violations after the utility
received a new NPDES permit that allowed an increase to the previous levels of
discharge). But cf. Sierra Club v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 636 F. Supp. 527, 528-29
(W.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to dismiss a case as moot even after the discharger sold its
plant equipment and permanently shut down).
269 Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3185 (1989).
27o See infra notes 272-75.
211 Petition for cert., 57 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1988) (No. 88-660).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim -
most often converted to a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 in the citizen suit
context).
273 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) (a motion to dismiss on the grounds of a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction).
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gation" is sufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court, albeit under a different standard of the quality of
"cure" the discharger has achieved at the time suit is brought. 274
However, he stated that independently of subject matter juris-
diction, a defendant may challenge a plaintiff's standing with
the result that only the violation's actual existence, not its good
faith allegation, would support a plaintiff's standing.275 Arguably
this interpretation of standing could accelerate a trial on the
merits to a hearing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
Another troubling decision under Gwaltney III that shifts
the balance of enforcement authority back toward citizens is
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc.276 The court in Carter-Wallace stated that once a
citizen suit is properly commenced - the citizen meets the
jurisdictional threshold - the court has the authority to impose
any penalty amount (up to statutory maximum) on past viola-
tions that is appropriate. 277 This holding again suggests that an
actual violation of the CWA need not be found, only that
sufficient facts be alleged to support the "continuing" standard
of the good faith allegation.
In Hudson River Fishermen's Association v. Westchester,278
a landfill operator was sued by an environmental group under
section 505. The defendant had allowed leachate and storm water
runoff to be discharged through a pipe in a small impound-
ment. 27 9 The defendants attempted to cap the pipe and invoke
Gwaltney.280 However, the court rejected the argument to dismiss
for lack of a continuing violation . 2 8 The evidence submitted
showed that the cap on the pipe leaked and could be manually
removed. 2 2 Thus the court here could easily sustain both the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court and plaintiff's standing
"I Gwaltney II, 108 S. Ct. 376, 387 (1988) (J. Scalia, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (claiming that the Court's "good faith allegation" would
differ little from his view in practical application).
"7 Id. at 388 (if "the defendant were in a state of compliance when this suit was
filed, the plaintiff would have been suffering no remediable injury in fact that could
support suit").
176 684 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.J. 1988).
277 Id. at 118.
686 F. Supp. 1044, (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
279 Id. at 1047.





since violations did exist at the time suit was brought. It would
appear that this is the type of situation that the Supreme Court
had in mind when it decided Gwaltney.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATORY ACTION
Congress has shown no inclination to eliminate the increas-
ingly controversial citizen suit. The legislative branch has shown
it keeps a watchful eye on executive branch enforcement and
citizen enforcement actions and has adjusted the balance of
power between them to fit its current view of the policies behind
the provision. Government enforcement officials at the same
time have had to struggle with the question of whether to treat




The recent increase in private attorney general actions by
ideological plaintiffs with their own conception of the responsi-
bilities of citizenship has led to an increase in total enforcement
but at the cost of national consistency. If citizen suits are to
continue to supplement and enhance the role of the regulatory
authority, the remedies in these suits must be more consistent
with the national goals of the Act.
The courts have treated citizen suits in an ad-hoc fashion,
"creating random and discrete judicial limitations on the role of
citizen suits in the enforcement of environmental laws.''284 Dif-
fering judicial philosophies have led to two serious concerns;
citizen suits invite judicial lawmaking where the government is
not a party to the suit, and citizen suits impair the mix of
cooperation and deterrence that is necessary under the environ-
mental laws. 285 A section 505 remedy must not result in enforce-
ment of a different nature from that desired by Congress, nor
may such a remedy disrupt a statutory compromise or cause
overenforcement of the law.
One solution to the conflict between the right established by
Congress that allows citizens to sue violators and the consistency
of national enforcement would be to establish rules under the
citizen suit provision reflecting a compromise position. These
rules would be aimed at making citizen suit remedies more
consistent nationwide. The rules could not restrict the citizen's
, Price, supra note 39, at 31.
Comment, supra note 122, at 236.
Id. at 223.
1989-901
JOURNAL OF MNERAL LAW & POLICY
right to bring suit since it is statutorily established. However, in
the interest of national consistency and fairness to similarly
situated defendants, the EPA and state regulatory agencies could
establish detailed rules and guidelines2 6 to establish appropriate
remedies to further the national goals of the Act and not hinder
future agency enforcement of other cases. This is particularly
important in the policy-oriented remedies such as monetary pen-
alties for past violations and other deterrence related actions.
Rules could be similar the the EPA's civil penalty policy or
drawn from many of the reported citizen suit cases. Once these
rules are promulgated through the public notice and comment
process, then open and meaningful debate on these policy issues
could result in workable solutions that would allow continued
citizen enforcement that is consistent with the important national
goals Congress had in mind when it passed the Clean Water
Act.
CONCLUSION
Traditional environmental law in the clean water area before
1972 had pitted the government against corporations. During the
1970s, it often thrust environmental groups against the govern-
- The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to
promulgate rules under the CWA in broad grant of authority in 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a):
The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are nec-
essary to carry out his functions under this chapter.
Arguably, the Administrator's power would reach the establishment of standards for
citizen remedies that are "necessary to carry out his functions" under the Act. Consistent
application of the law is a fundamental responsibility of the Administrator under any
regulatory system.
In contrast, the citizen suit provision allows as a remedy any "appropriate civil
penalties." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added). There is no definition in the Act for
appropriate, but the dictionary definition includes "fitting," "proper" and "[sluitable
for a particular person, condition, [or] occasion." THE AmERicAN HERITAGE DIcTIoNARY
OF TmE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64 (1975). Appropriate civil penalties would be only those
that further the purposes of the Act, including consistent application of the law and the
pursuit of nationwide enforcement.
Congress even contemplated that the administrator would develop regulations under
the citizen suit provisions:
Public participation in the ... enforcement of any regulation, standard,
[or] effluent limitation . .. established by the Administrator or any State
under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the
Administrator and the States. The Administrator . . . shall develop and
publish regulations specifying minimum guidelines for public participation
in such processes.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (emphasis added).
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ment. Now, under citizen suit provisions of most environmental
regulation passed since 1970, environmental groups and citizens
are battling corporations under the color of state and federal
statutes.
The evolution of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act has
become a virtual three-way tug of war between environmental
groups, the regulated industry and the government. Each party
has its own view of the scope and philosophy of section 505.
Through various legislative acts and judicial decisions in response
to the large increase in citizen suits, the parties are changing the
contours of the basic policy of the Clean Water Act. The 1987
Amendments to the CWA altered the relevant enforcement au-
thority under the statute to allow the government more control
of citizen suit litigation. The Gwaltney decision significantly
reduced the punishment aspect of such suits.
There is no legislative history that indicates Congress was
willing to sacrifice consistency and coordination because of the
value of citizen suits. Since enforcement is such an integral part
of the total policy of the Act, liberal allowance of remedies in
citizen suits is unwise. The increasing number of citizen suits
that extract large penalties may result in "overdeterrence" where
serious violators may alter DMRs to show no violations and
thus undermine a principle part of the CWA - the record
system's ability to pinpoint violators.
Environmental groups, anxious though they may be to vin-
dicate and protect congressionally established rights to a cleaner
environment, must always endeavor to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate overall government en-
forcement policy. Rulemaking to establish minimal standards for
remedies under section 505 would continue to represent a system
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of local
citizen groups while restoring the necessary fairness and conti-
nuity of national governmental policy reflected in the Clean
Water Act. The alternative to establishing minimal consistency
could very well be the historical solution to aggressive bounty
hunting, which would be in the present context, the erosion of
public confidence in the motives of the citizen groups and pos-
sible extinction of the right.
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